Is Place a Text?

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Abstract Textuality is a central feature of much hermeneutics, and is implicit in much analysis of place from a hermeneutical point of view, but has not often been analyzed. This chapter considers the usefulness and limits of the metaphor of text for place. While there is no doubt that our engagement with place can be textualized, it is useful to a hermeneutics of place to hold the metaphor of textuality in abeyance and consider what other forms of meaning or its lack or absence might arise with the use of other metaphors. I consider other metaphors, specifically place as body, place as scene, place as image/visuality, and place as haunting, to try to highlight aspects of place that might be easy to overlook if we take the text to be the act of understanding itself rather than a metaphor with its own provenance and horizons.

There was a time, not all that long ago, when all we could talk about was textuality. From the time that Derrida told us that "Il n'y a pas de hors-texte," or "There is no outside-text," critical scholarship enthusiastically debated the nature and status of textuality, what form it took, how deep it went, how stable it was. This peaked in about 1994 (at least, according to Google Books Ngram Viewer, admittedly a blunt instrument when it comes to semantics), and sharply dropped off thereafter. From our vantage point today, discussing textuality seems almost quaint or outdated ("text" has also seen a drop in usage, but not as marked and not as clear when it comes to theoretical uses). At this point (and again Google comes to the rescue, this time Google Scholar) the majority of uses of the term seem to focus on digital studies and the shifting nature of texts as shared production and consumption and the changing nature of narrative in digital space.

The waxing and waning of concept usage is fascinating. Are we talking less about textuality because we have worked out all the issues by this point and have come to some sort of agreement on what we mean by it and how it works? Because the battle lines from the 1980s are no longer there? Because the problematic has exhausted itself, that is, the range of possible questions that a concept activates has

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been worked out, like an exhausted mine? Or have we just moved on to something else, as our conceptual ecology shifts focus?

The question is a significant one for anyone taking hermeneutics seriously, because "text" and "textuality" are concepts that have enormous (albeit sometimes ambiguous) currency. Classically, contemporary philosophical hermeneutics has depended on the metaphor of textuality, and despite its centrality, I will maintain throughout this chapter that it is a metaphor. The central transcendental question of hermeneutics, which is something like "How is understanding possible at all, and how is it implemented practically" quickly moves to what seems to be a similar question, but which is not: "How do we explicate the most ubiquitous image of the site and context of understanding, the text?" As has been pointed out, though, discussions about textuality have waned, and so we might imagine that the case for hermeneutics has been established. It is more likely, though, that those who regard human meaning as fundamentally textual have simply continued in this belief, and those who have always questioned the applicability of "text" as a model for human life have moved on to other questions. In other words, we may have simply exhausted the discussion about texts and textuality in the terms it has been presented in the past.

After a paper I gave at a conference on place and space, I asked the audience whether place was a text. The response I got was instant and incredulous – of course, what else could it possibly be? All intelligibility and all meaning, my audience thought, could only be textual intelligibility and meaning. The conference was not a literature or rhetoric conference, but an interdisciplinary conference on space and place, and so it was strange that the metaphor of textuality was not seen as a metaphor with a history of use and limits to usefulness, but as the very act of intelligibility itself, and the only obviously viable mode of understanding place. It is this assumption that I want to question in this chapter.

If the frame of reference is the hermeneutic tradition, the debt of understanding to a textual tradition is unsurprising. But it is still a metaphor. It still has its roots as a technology and a set of practices in a specific history and cultural space. This is not to say that texts only exist within a single cultural space, but that they are theorized and part of sets of practices that are the stuff of culture itself. Furthermore, there is more than just a metaphor, there are exemplars of the metaphor, which underscore a particular approach to understanding. It is not just any text that gives us the quintessential or ideal interpretive space. Religious texts first, and later artistic texts, in both Heidegger and Gadamer, are the best exemplars of textuality, and then these exemplars are absorbed into hermeneutics, leaving their traces. As Gadamer says, "[e]very work of art, not only literature, must be understood like any other text that requires understanding … *Aesthetics has to be absorbed into hermeneutics*." (Gadamer *Truth and Method* 2004, 157, italics in original; see Schmidt 2015 for more). In other words, even as textuality is the very nature of understanding in any form, the textuality that hermeneutics tends to regard as determinative has a particular history and form.

And so, the task of this chapter will be to prise apart the text from the act of understanding when it comes to how we address place. As Edward Casey, Jeff

Malpas and others have amply demonstrated via Heidegger and others, our fundamental mode of being is platial (Casey 1993; Malpas 2012). We cannot extract ourselves from place and regard it at arm's length, and we cannot think ourselves as anything but platial. Dwelling is as fundamental as temporality. But that then raises a question for the metaphor of the text. We can see in Heidegger, Gadamer and others that it is our encounter with the text, however that is conceived, that brings us into reflective being. Is text, then, just another term for place, or vice versa? If it is neither, what are the differences? Does text exceed place, or place exceed text, or perhaps both? Can we maintain the fundamental insight that place is constitutive of the self if we allow ourselves to think about place in a manner other than textual, or more than textual? And, assuming that we can continue to see place as constitutive of the self, what would it mean for place to be a fundamental act and site of understanding, but for that to be thought more broadly than the metaphor of the text?

I wish to re-ask the question in this chapter's title in a slightly different form. "Is place a text?" is perhaps more pithy, but the following question might be closer to the point: "Does textuality exhaust the possibilities of place?" Is place a text, or is place textualized as an act of understanding, but could be rendered otherwise, also as an act of understanding? And, if all concepts have their limits, what are the limits of thinking through textuality, and in particular the specific forms of textuality that hermeneutics has classically used as its exemplars? The title of this chapter is in the form of a question, as is my revision, which might suggest that this chapter is an answer to that question. Instead, though, I wish to use the question as an opening to consider the range of modes we have for understanding place. I wish to argue that place is not so much a text as it is a mode of questioning, and a site for questioning. We question places, and they question us, in a hermeneutical exchange that may seem dialectical (and takes that character in part from Heidegger and Gadamer in their discussions of the nature of questioning), but in fact also resembles the tensions and intensities that Deleuze and Guattari posit as the nomadic condition of the *bios*. The metaphor of textuality describes certain features of the site of questioning, and privileges some modes of understanding place over others. I want to suggest other possible metaphors for place that make other forms of questioning available.

"Text" is a term that has etymological and provenantial roots that run from Greek to Latin to old French, before arriving in English. A text is an inscription, but it has similar roots to words such as "textile" and "texture." In Latin text is the participial stem of *texĕre*, which refers to something that is woven or fabricated. ("text, n. 1," OED 2015) Origin is not destiny, of course, much less meaning, and the mere fact that the word "text" has these roots tells us little about its provenance (or to use a more Gadamerian term, its tradition). Gadamer, in *Truth and Method*, gives a kind of story of provenance about textuality, one which would see it as a series of successive broadenings towards a universal hermeneutic, which comes with successive broadenings of what counts as a text. (Gadamer 2004; see also Palmer 1969, pp. 38–45 for an extended discussion of this understanding of the history of hermeneutics). The text is originally exemplified by the religious text, a text that has continuous contemporary moral authority even as it recedes into history. Schleiermacher realizes that the techniques developed for the Bible may be relevant for any text, and sets forth a hermeneutics modelled on the religious text that accounts for the rich-

ness of meaning we derive from any text. Dilthey broadens hermeneutics to apply to social situations, effectively turning society into a text. Nietzsche and others realize that we can regard ourselves as texts, and fictional ones at that, texts not determined by their outside references but in their own terms (which is why "good" and "evil" are less important than "interesting" in the story we write about ourselves). Heidegger broadens the discussion further, making it possible to see not just ourselves as individuals but Being itself as hermeneutic. Gadamer grounds this Being in tradition, effectively turning textuality's own provenance into its own frame, without regarding that frame as determinative or strictly causal.

In each case, the touchstone is a version of textuality, one which becomes more stretched over time, but which nevertheless has a provenance. As the text broadens, it becomes much more encompassing of all sorts of language events and signification (Heidegger, after all, focuses far more on language than on texts themselves, Silverman 1994, 54). Gadamer, indeed, maintains the link to textuality – *Truth and Method* came about because he wanted to make clear his "practice of the interpretation of texts and [his] teaching generally." (Misgeld & Nicholson, eds., 63). One might, of course, see Gadamer as a kind of retrenchment toward textuality after Heidegger's move to the hermeneutics of existence (as Odo Marquard remarked, perhaps Gadamer replaced Heidegger's "Being-toward-death" with "Being-toward-the-text." (Marquard 1981, 130)) Ricoeur, finally, reasserts a more limited version of textuality (a text is "discourse fixed by writing," a preservation of textuality with a move away from the *Lebensphilosophie* in Dilthey's definition of the text as "expressions of life fixed in writing", Ricoeur 1981, 145), not to overturn hermeneutics but to address seemingly hostile approaches the model of understanding as textual from Marx, Freud, Saussure, and Derrida, among others (of course, Gadamer does the same in "Text and Interpretation", Gadamer 2007).

It is worth noting that the expansion of the text also means a kind of move away from the text, at least inasmuch as the stance toward the text is one of interpretation. Heidegger, for instance, explicitly positions hermeneutics as the bearing of a message, and does not particularly emphasize textuality (one struggles, in fact, to find a direct reference to textuality, as opposed to language, works of art, or some specific form of "conversation" such as poetry). Having said that, one might say that the approach to the text is what has been broadened, such that the literal text falls away as an inadequate or distracting metaphor for understanding. So, as the text becomes a broader metaphor, so too does the approach to the text move from an inscription to language itself.

1   Place and Textuality

Textuality, then, is a core concept for hermeneutics. As Jeff Malpas among others has shown, place too is a core concept in hermeneutics (Malpas 2015). It is natural to think, then, that there is a relationship here, that place is simply a specific kind of text, or perhaps the necessary context of all texts. And, there is no doubt that there

are at least some textual elements to place. We read places. We write them, individually and collectively. They are not only meaningful, they are the structure of meaning, that is, they are the context in which meaning happens. Of course, not every place may be meaningful, but that is not the point. Not every text is meaningful either, at least not to everyone, not all the time. We recognize texts as being texts in another language, or perhaps in no language at all (for example, the Voynich Manuscript). Texts are the space of understanding for hermeneutics. In fact, we might expand the parallels between texts and places:

1. There is in both some sort of inscription. There is a "fixing" of discourse, whether intentional or not. A path through a wood inscribes a social space, even if it was not intended as inscription. Architecture orders space and in doing so suggests practices, even while remaining open to transgressive "readings" of their physicality.

2. There is reading, or there are readings. If place is a text, what does it mean to read it? It might mean comprehending place, but it might also mean performing, enacting, or practicing place. Enacting place (or "practicing" place, as de Certeau might have it, de Certeau 1984, 91–110) might turn it into space, but it might simply activate place, rendering its possibilities as actualities. Practicing place would mean tracing the paths that have been laid down before, but also creating new paths, even transgressing obvious or prescribed readings of places. Reading place, then, does not just mean the ability to apprehend the signifiers of place in a way that allows one to be at home in a place. It means creating and re-creating elements of a place in such a way that it is renewed. Gadamer's annual festival is an apt platial image of the ways in which performative re-creation maintains the spirit and meaning of a place.

3. There might be a literacy or lack thereof. In other words, there might be an acquired ability to apprehend place. A person may not be versed in the vernacular of a place, or in the signifiers which come out of a subculture. There may, in other words, be something beyond the observation that place is like language. Language may or may not be a natural capacity for humans, but a particular language, that in which a text is written, is certainly not, even though we do not manifest our capacity for "language" in the abstract. Likewise, our engagement with place may only be manifest through our engagement with places, all of which function like a text in a language, requiring literacy and other sorts of familiarity. We might see this as the hermeneutic circle of place.

4. There may be authors and there may be audiences for both texts and places. We need not imagine a divine author to see places, even "natural" ones, as having human and cultural imprints, in concert with the imprints of nonhumans. This is true for any place – the textuality of place is always a layered, sometimes contradictory, always variegated affair.

5. There is a kind of boundedness for both places and texts. Meaning is made available through materiality and tradition. Places, like texts, show forth a world. There are horizons of meaning for both, and prejudices, in Gadamer's sense.

6. There is reflexivity in both texts and places. The operative question asked by both a text and a place, especially for Gadamer, is "Who are you who can read me this way?" A reading shows forth a way of being. The ontological structuring of text and place in relation to our own subjectivity, at both the individual and the social level, is crucial. Neither text nor place are arm's-length encounters, and neither are merely objects for analysis, interpretation, or deciphering without also being ways of showing the prejudices of the self in making specific choices about those things.

7. There are mediums. To the extent that we think about textuality on the model of print publication (which is for the most part assumed throughout the development of hermeneutic theory, despite Gadamer's extension of textuality to art), we imagine that text is identical to its medium from a hermeneutic point of view. Place, too, is not just virtual, at least not from a hermeneutic point of view. Even digital place is not wholly virtual – it is the product of practices and performances that have various levels of reference to practices and performances in material space. If place is a text, it too is inscribed on something, in a way that can be read differently by different people, that can be rewritten and reinterpreted.

8. There are genres, that is, there are sets of conventions that we use to shorthand both texts and places. This suggests that in both there are narratives, some of which are common enough in some respects to merit a label. We have mysteries and vampire novels and poetry; we have strip malls and government spaces and national parks. With all these we can push the edges of the genres, and with all these we can wish for or imagine a (possibly idealized) genre-less form, texts and places that are wholly original. That wish is likely to go unfulfilled, though, as we continually trade on already familiar elements.

9. We can have a hermeneutics of trust and a hermeneutics of suspicion. There can be an apparent meaning of a place, and a meaning that is held back, or only available to some. Places can be banal or profound, as can texts. They can be derivative; they can hold one superficial meaning while disguising or eliding others. Places, like texts, are nothing without their engagement, without the kinds of reading they can be subjected to, and so we can easily imagine a place that presents itself as benign to someone while being something much more sinister to someone else, someone of a different race or culture or class.

10. There is an affective element to both text and place. We have an orientation toward both texts and places that shows us for who we are, that predisposes us toward particular reactions, formations, and implications. This affect is more than just an internalized subjectivity or prior attitude that colors an otherwise "objective" text or place, but arises in the encounter, as a mode of understanding.

11. There is no retrieval of an "original," either with texts or places. We find ourselves within tradition in both cases, faced with a neverending chain of what has been.

12. For Ricoeur at least, the text is the "long route" through the analysis of language (as opposed to Heidegger's "short route", the analysis of Dasein), by

which he means the establishment of a world in which the text interacts with other texts as opposed to being the expression of a pre-judgment (see Ricoeur 1974, p. 11, and also Ricoeur 1976 for a fuller account). If taken in these terms, the text as metaphor for place suggests a kind of productive distanciation, a "world" as opposed to a situation (Ricoeur 1976, 36–37).

Without question, then, the metaphor of textuality is useful for understanding place. There are, to be sure, potential problems with this parallel. For instance, what do we make of natural places? If texts and places are by definition the basis of and framework for understanding, are we committed to nature being a place only inasmuch as it has engaged with humans? Natural place is, for some, the quintessential place, and yet if it is, it might seem as if we are committed to some version of, on the one hand, either transcendentalism or romanticism (and in both cases, ultimately some version of anthropocentrism as well), or on the other some version of bio/zoo-semiotics. In other words, if the natural world is a text, it might either be a divine text or one that deals with meaning very differently from hermeneutics. If place is a text, we are faced with the question of whose text it is. Are we faced with the "book of nature," the classic parallel between text and natural place, in which the meaningfulness of place is assured because of its divine authorship? Or is it just the palimpsest of innumerable natural actions, scientifically readable but not rooted in any textual tradition? It is perhaps no accident that when hermeneutics has considered the question of place, it has largely focused on built place – architecture, urban and rural space that has had human intervention. Heidegger's essay "Building Dwelling Thinking" makes that connection clear – to dwell is to build in a specific manner, one which allows human existence to flourish (Heidegger 1975). Place, then, is understandable to the extent that it is not wholly other, to the extent that building has allowed *alethia* to occur. This makes the hermeneutic project a very human one (see, for instance, the range of approaches in Treanor 2015, all of which have in common a human engagement with the environment), which at least raises the question of what might happen if we imagine decentering the human in the interpretive act (of course, such an imagination is still a human imagination, and so the mere act of imagining does not move us into the space of the non-human). The result, for instance, of thinking about the environment hermeneutically has been to think of it narratively (e.g., van Buren 1995).

The same, it should be said, is true of other "places" that have no human engagement. If we live in the Anthropocene now, what do we make of the time before or outside of that age? All that is true of the limits of regarding nature as a place would also be true for regarding anything outside of the Anthropocene as a place. These questions are close to those raised by Quentin Meillassoux and Alain Badiou concerning to the critique of the assumption of finitude (for a more extended response to this, see S. Purcell 2010).

The response to these questions, I want to argue, does not lie in abandoning the hermeneutical project, nor even in abandoning the central metaphor of textuality, but in placing it alongside other metaphors and resisting the inclination to reduce metaphors to each other. This will have the effect of bringing fundamental difference and

dialogue within the bounds of hermeneutics itself, as a question at the heart of hermeneutics, rather than regarding hermeneutics as a method which is above and prior to all human practices of meaning. Seeing the fissures between disparate metaphors for place as a task for hermeneutics, as a space of dialogue within hermeneutics itself, will accomplish what has rarely been done with hermeneutics or indeed with most other dialects of philosophy – to see thought itself as being in place.

2   At the Edges of Textuality

So, clearly textuality is **a** central, perhaps **the** central metaphor for place. At the same time, there are frayed edges, places where the metaphor shows its limits. These are the places, I will argue, where many of the interesting questions about place arise. One way to see what those questions might be is to suggest other metaphors for place, with a hope that the fraying is productive. We have already seen that there is an exemplar of textuality that haunts the discussion within hermeneutics, the religious and the aesthetic text. We have seen that textuality is an intervention of some sort, and that nature itself may be one of those limits, the unthought limit that describes the border of the efficacy of the textual metaphor. One who is committed to the metaphor as more than a metaphor, that is, as the very nature of understanding itself, might be inclined to argue that everything can be textualized, and that person would be correct. But if we hold that impulse in abeyance for a moment, we can start to investigate the new ideas that emerge at the edges of our metaphors.

There are many possible alternative metaphors; we will only consider a few here.

These are: place as body, place as scene, place as image/visuality, place as haunting.

1. Place as Body David Morris, in his chapter on Edward Casey in the present volume says this: "[T]he discovery of periphenomena wakes Casey to place as itself undermining determinate presence, thence turning him to a topological variant of Derrida, or of Merleau-Ponty's later ontology of an invisible that indwells in the visible yet is nowhere fully present. These works … suggest a 'deconstructive' hermeneutics of place, that challenges any approach to place as a fully present 'text' already there to be interpreted."

Morris' comment on Casey points to the ways in which place, like body, is not always already present. To the extent that texts are fixed, places are not. Of course, texts might not fixed either, inasmuch as they are part of layered and contradictory interpretations over time. And yet, it is at least possible that place has more fluidity, or at least viscosity, than a text demands. As Merleau-Ponty suggests, the invisible dwells in the visible, and just as the body shows forth those modes of being, so too do places. We might be tempted to subsume both bodies and places under the essential structures of meaning that texts move us towards – after all, to regard something as a text is to regard it as at least in principle interpretable. Bodies, and

places, also live at the edge of the uninterpretable. They are not simply what is not yet known, but may be what is never known.

But places, like bodies, also know. Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela developed the concept of "autopoesis", the idea that living bodies are self-organizing systems. Places operate in the same manner, at least in the sense that they operate as coherent, responsive, positive feedback models. They are not quasi-Romantic forms of consciousness (the dream of Gaia is a futile one), but they are contained but permeable modes of knowledge which require that we respond as knowledge responds to knowledge, rather than as knowledge responds to object of investigation. (Janz 2009)

In some ways, this is the form most appropriate for natural places.

2. Place as Scene The scene, unlike the dwelling, is a synchronic mode of place-making. The "gay scene" or the "jazz scene" is less about temporality (and hence the sense of being un-homed) than it is about shifting and provisional theatrical constructions of place. It is transgressive, place played off against place, edges always in play. Alan Blum (Blum 2003) gives the best description of the scene, and at the same time points out the central issue at stake in the scene: "One crucial interpretive site where the question of the scene – its parameters and boundaries – comes alive is around the issue of *becoming*, that is, of coming-to-be and perishing." (Blum 2003, 168). It is all about the wager of the space – what does it mean to be in or out, and how can one's actions be appropriate to the shifting patterns and requirements of the scene? Hermeneutics has tended to be a theory of being. Blum raises the question of how place, in this case a shifting social place, is a space of becoming. Hermeneutics has rendered moments of change as moments on the way to or from *alethia*, instances of the manifestation of being or its covering-over. Using the metaphor of scene makes it possible to think place not as fundamentally a mode of being, but of becoming, not as always provisional, lacking, and a form of negation, but as positive. In the scene, we do not move to a dwelling, but dwell by moving (for a picture of this, see Wise 2000).

3. Place as Image/Visuality Isn't an image just a text? Certainly Gadamer assumed that – he moved very quickly to visual art, and *Bild* and its cognates renders the act of understanding ambiguous between language and visual sensation. And yet, it might be worth resisting this easy equation, at least provisionally and heuristically.

Visuality presupposes distanciation, as does textuality, but in a different manner. Ricoeur argues that the distanciation of the text embeds it in a world in which the mode of understanding is no longer specifically related to author and audience (as problematic as those both are), but to other texts. The distanciation of the image is not just about answering to a different set of imperatives, though. It is about remembering the creative event that occurs as an artist creates an experience. Gadamer knew this, but folded it back into textuality. Is there not creativity in the production of a text? Of course there is. But there is also a materiality in much artistic creation which is absent from most textual production, or at least incidental to it. There are, of course, always exceptions to this, but the point here is to create a tension, to resist the easy deflation of all art into forms of textuality. Keith Harder's chapter in this

volume underscores this materiality – his description of working with the paint and engaging place through land art suggests a kind of presence to the edges of under-standing, to the place that resists textualization.

4. Place as Haunting Derrida spoke of the "specters of Marx" and the "hauntol-ogy" that was part of political theory today (Derrida 1994). What is less recognized is that he uses similar terms in talking about place ("lieu"), which he does with surprising frequency in later writings. Derrida is usually seen as anything but a fel-low traveler with hermeneuticists, based on the unsatisfying dialogue with Gadamer and his continual reconfiguration of phenomenology. At the same time, especially later in his life, he encounters his own places, not primarily to theorize "place" in some rigorous sense, but to think through his "debts and duties" to his places. And so, his childhood in Algeria, his love of Strasbourg, his French-ness, his Jewish-ness – all these are moments in which he finds a different kind of haunting, a differ-ent engagement with spatiality than those who only know his work on *khōra* might see. It is the cinders, the "there which is not there" that first comes from Derrida himself being haunted by the Holocaust, and then also being haunted by the trou-bled history of Algeria, and his own history within that country. Catherine Malabou captures some of this in *Counterpath* (Malabou and Derrida 2004), a sense of what haunts Derrida as he re-imagines his philosophy in the different places he finds himself throughout his life.

We might ask what kind of place can happen in this haunting. There is a sense that place is the moment of the event, the *Ereignis* in which haunting brings into being a specificity that distinguishes a place as having meaning. This is certainly consistent with Heidegger, and would be a debt that Derrida carries from Heidegger (and of course, also from Marx, as he outlines in *Specters of Marx*, 1994). And there are stories of haunting within the phenomenological tradition (Bell 1997). But there is another version of place, rooted in becoming rather than being, that we might see in someone like Deleuze and the concept of the virtuality. Here too we have place, but now a place of creation. Place is not just the object of or occasion for meaning to be expressed, but the locus of the encounter between world and self, and as such, it is the place of a new creation.

3   Conclusion

There is a seeming tension between the idea that hermeneutics "points to a universal ontological structure" (Gadamer 2004, 470) and one of the core aspects of herme-neutics, that dialogue and the encounter of difference is a central moment in under-standing. Does hermeneutics itself exist in dialogue, and if so, dialogue with what (Janz 2015)? What is the other of hermeneutics that makes dialogue possible? My contention here is that hermeneutics itself has a place, an intellectual set of formative conditions and questions, along with an audience, as part of its development. It does indeed point to a universal ontological structure, but the operative words here are

"point to." To the extent that we take any metaphor, including that of "text" as an already accomplished fact about the means of understanding, we have missed the potential for dialogue over the nature of understanding itself.

It might be argued that my version of textuality here has been too limited and, perhaps, too literal. My goal, though, has been to reinject the tradition of the text, its materiality and the fact that it is a technology, rooted in a cultural past, and that this does matter to how we have come to understand understanding. Furthermore, the point has not been to deny that place is a text – surely it is. But if we retain the memory of the materiality and technology of the text, we might see the frayed edges of the metaphor, and in a truly hermeneutical moment open the door to an encounter around the concept and experience of place.

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